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Abstract
Since the early 1980s, there has been a mounting debate in industry
literature and in U.S. government-sponsored reports over the relative
performance of software developers in Japan versus those in the United States.
This literature is divided between assertions of Japanese or U.S. superiority in
this technology. However, both sides of the debate have offered evidence that,
to date, has been primarily qualitative or based on one or two cases.
This paper contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it offers a
comprehensive literature review that analyzes existing comparisons of Japanese
and U.S. firms in software development and summarizes the major proposed
differences in performance. Second, it presents the first set of quantitative
data collected from a statistically comparable sample of 24 U.S. and 16 Japanese
software-development projects, and uses these data to test propositions from
the literature. The analyses indicate that Japanese programmers perform at
least as well as their U.S. counterparts in basic measures of productivity,
quality (defects), and reuse of software code. The data also make it possible to
offer models that explain some of the differences in productivity and quality.
[SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY; SOFTWARE QUALITY; SOFTWARE
REUSE; JAPANESE SOFTWARE; JAPANESE MANAGEMENT METHODS]
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I. Introductionl
Japanese firms have become well-known for their high levels of
productivity and reliability in manufacturing, their quality in product
engineering, and the increasing sophistication and diversity of their products.
They have competed effectively in a broad range of industries, with products of
varying degrees of complexity in design, engineering, and assembly: steel,
ships, automobiles, televisions, video recorders, machine tools, semiconductors,
and computer hardware, to name a few. Yet, despite this impressive record of
successes, some researchers doubt whether the Japanese will duplicate their
achievements with new, still-evolving technologies, where customers and
producers have yet to define product or process standards. A major challenge
-- and the subject of this comparative paper -- is the design and production of
computer software.
Managing software development has been problematic since the beginning
of the industry in the late 1950s, when programmable computers first appeared.
Rapidly changing and rising demand has consistently exceeded the ability of
educational institutions and companies to train enough skilled programmers to
meet market needs. Attempts to manage the development process more
effectively have seemed woefully inadequate compared to dramatic improvements
in hardware. Many software producers continue to experience cost and schedule
overruns as the rule rather than the exception, while huge variations in
customer requirements and programmer productivity have further complicated
managerial tasks. As a result, characteristics of the industry and the
1 The authors would like to thank each company and individual who
participated in this study, since their cooperation made this effort possible.
The authors also gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Kent
Wallgren, who assisted in the data collection and preliminary analysis as part of
a Masters' Thesis Project at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management in 1987-
1988. Helpful comments were received on an early draft from W. Orlikowski, N.
Venkatraman, and D. Zweig.
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technology produced a situation referred to as the "software crisis" as long ago
as 1969 (Hunke 1981, Frank 1983). Most of the problems cited in the 1960s
continued to plague software producers in the 1980s (Arden 1980, Boehm 1987,
Ramamoorthy 1984, Brooks 1987).
The primary objectives of this paper were to compile comparisons of
Japanese and U.S. project performance in software and then offer some
exploratory but quantitative data in order to shed some light on a debate that,
up to the present, has proceeded largely in an anecdotal and qualitative fashion.
The disagreements center around the efficacy of the Japanese in software
development, specifically, whether Japanese firms have been able to transfer
their skills in engineering, production, and organization management to this
relatively new technology.
This paper is structured as follows: The second section reviews existing
literature in an attempt to identify what statements observers have made
regarding the Japanese and U.S. in software development. The third section
explains the research methodology followed to confirm or deny several
propositions indicated in the literature. This methodology consisted of the
collection of quantitative data on a sample of actual software projects done in
the U.S. and Japan. The subsequent sections analyze the sample in some detail,
including descriptive information, process data, and performance comparisons.
The concluding section summarizes the results and limitations of the study, as
well as implications for future research.
1I. Literature Review: Propositions in the Debate
A review of more than a dozen sources published between 1969 and 1989
revealed a debate with two sides, neither well-supported. On the one hand
were claims that the Japanese were significantly behind the U.S. overall in
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software development, especially in products. The arguments consisted of
general statements that Japanese firms relied on tools and techniques adopted
from the U.S. and Europe, and they suffered from a severe shortage of skilled
programmers. Japanese programmers also seemed to lack creativity and the
ability to invent new products or offer sophisticated products, especially
software packages. Japanese software also seemed more costly than U.S.
programs. In addition, the Japanese were behind in basic research. To many
authors, these reasons made it unlikely Japanese firms would compete effectively
in the U.S. software market (Table 1).
On the other side of the debate were arguments that Japanese firms were
ahead in areas related to the process of software development: productivity,
quality (defect) levels, tool usage, and reusability, as well as discipline,
teamwork, planning, and management. Some authors also believed that problems
common in programming might actually benefit from skills Japanese firms and
workers seem to possess in abundance, such as excellence in planning, problem-
solving, process management and attention to detail, willingness to cooperate
and communicate, high motivation among workers and managers, creativity in
nearly all things mechanical, and general perseverance (see, for example, Belady
1986).2 In the product area, there were more disagreements, although some
observers felt the Japanese were at least equal to the U.S. in custom
applications programming and specific software areas (real-time applications,
graphics and video programs, super-computer programs, on-line reservation
systems, and embedded software in consumer and industrial products) (Table 2).
Comments from specific articles reflects the qualitative and sometimes
contradictory nature of the debate. For example, a 1983 publication based on a
2 Although the literature on Japanese management styles and employee
behavior is too long to cite comprehensively, examples include Vogel 1979, Cole
1979, Schonberger 1982, and Abegglen and Stalk 1985.
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visit to 10 Japanese software producers and RD organizations, sponsored in
part by the U.S. Office of Naval Research (Kim 1983), claimed Toshiba's
Software Factory was "one of the most advanced real-time software engineering
organizations in the world," with productivity averaging 2870 instructions per
programmer month in 1981, an extremely high level compared to U.S. figures.
The author thought that the productivity advantage stemmed from a Japanese
lead in developing and using integrated tool sets. In the product area, the
Japanese appeared behind in package development but advanced in real-time
software and artificial intelligence applications (primarily for language
translation).
A 1986 article provided more numbers from Toshiba: 65% reuse in
delivered code and productivity of 2000 lines per month per programmer, with
merely 0.3 defects per 1000 lines of code (Haavind 1986). Once again, however,
the author did not describe the number and nature of the projects covered, or
what specifically the numbers measured. These were important qualifications:
For example, a 1987 article by the Toshiba manager who headed the software
factory noted all productivity figures were annual averages converted to
"equivalent assembler source lines of code," not actual number of lines written.
There were also various defect levels, depending on customer requirements and
length of testing (Matsumoto 1987). But while the numbers were difficult to
assign precisely, other articles continued to report higher levels of reuse in
Japan (Standish 1984, Tracz 1988) as well as greater management emphasis on
designing for reuse and reusing code when developing new programs (Cusumano
1989).
A 1984 article, based on a questionnaire survey and site visits, examined
30 software production facilities at 13 Japanese and 13 U.S. companies
(Zelkowitz et al. 1984). The authors found similar technology for software
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development in the two countries, with Japanese firms relying on tools and
techniques from the U.S. or Europe. However, the Japanese seemed to use tools
more widely, perhaps because tool development came out of company overhead
rather than project budgets. This study also found the Japanese conducted
extensive analyses of the causes of software defects, although it left the
question open whether Japanese firms were systematically better in quality,
productivity, or other areas of software development.
In 1984, the U.S. Department of Commerce published an analysis of U.S.
competitiveness in software that cited both weaknesses and strengths in the
Japanese industry (U.S. Department of Commerce 1984). This report maintained
that the Japanese were "far behind the U.S. in basic research and advanced
development of software," and "have never developed a programming language or
an operating system that has become a de facto standard internationally."
Nonetheless, the authors recognized the Japanese were making rapid progress in
tool usage and product engineering, especially along the "software factory"
model, and were overtaking the U.S. in their efforts to move software
production beyond the "craft" stage. This report also contained some
quantitative data: "Japanese programmers average 2000 lines of code per month
(versus less than 300 lines per month for U.S. programmers) and have one-tenth
the error rate (defects) of their U.S. counterparts" (p. 11). However, the
Department of Commerce offered no information to allow the reader to evaluate
and compare the numbers it cited. The report did not, for example, reveal
what kind and how many projects, what phases of the development cycle, or
what levels of reused code these "averages" reflected.
Other articles continued to refer to high levels of productivity, reuse, and
quality in Japanese software, but general backwardness in products and
research. A 1984 article noted the rise of "software factories" in Japan and
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their highly systematic approach to software production, as well as Japanese
excellence in graphics and embedded software, such as in industrial and
consumer products. But it concluded that Japanese software "is less
sophisticated and more costly to produce than Western software" (Uttal 1984).
Another 1984 article noted Japanese strengths in certain types of software
products -- video games, super-computer programs, large-scale banking and
airline-reservation systems -- as well as a possible 10% to 15% edge in
productivity. However, the authors concluded the Japanese industry was too
small (one-quarter of U.S. sales) to compete effectively with the U.S. (Sakai
1984).
A 1987 study by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) on U.S.
competitiveness in service industries (Office of Technology Assessment 1987)
agreed the Japanese, in the long run, would "emerge as the primary U.S.
competitor in software." OTA concluded, however, that "Jipan remains
substantially behind in software, with poor applications packages -- along with
limited sales and service networks...." Nonetheless, Japan seemed to have
emerging strengths: The researchers asserted that Japanese systems software,
based on U.S. products, "is usually considered to be quite good," and Japanese
language processing software was sophisticated. Furthermore, while custom
programming was far less efficient than package use and still constituted the
bulk of the Japanese software market, Japanese firms such as Toshiba seemed to
excel at producing complex software efficiently and with many fewer defects
than in the U.S. (pp. 160-166).
While information on products was scarce and difficult to evaluate, a 1988
survey of 20,000 Japanese computer users by a Japanese journal indicated that
Japanese firms were to some extent superior to U.S. firms competing in Japan
in custom applications and software maintenance, in addition to offering lower
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prices for leased software and system-engineering services. But Japanese
customers were less satisfied with Japanese products, compared to U.S. products,
in basic systems software and office systems (Nikkei Computer March 1988,
September 1988; Cusumano 1988).
A study supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation to evaluate
Japanese technology (JTECH Project) concluded as well that, while Japanese
firms seemed excellent in product engineering, reusability, tool use, and quality,
Japan overall was behind in basic research and advanced development for
software (Gamaota and Frieman 1988). A 1989 article made broader claims,
noting that the Japanese software industry was still "small and not very
visible," and perhaps two decades behind the U.S. (Rifkin and Savage 1989). Yet
another 1989 essay maintained that, while the Japanese were strong in
applications systems for their home market, they appeared weak in other
product areas. This author argued that, in general, the Japanese suffered from
a severe shortage of skilled programmers and had few software houses that
were financially strong enough to compete with U.S. firms in the American
market (Lecht 1989).
Perhaps the most glaring defect in this literature has been its anecdotal
nature -- general comments that are difficult to test, such as assertions that
Japanese products lacked sophistication or creativity; and assertions that relied
on information from one or a few firms, with little or no attempt to collect
quantitative data systematically. Part of the reason for a debate of this type is
the difficulty of measuring performance in software programming or product
operation, especially across different users, producers, and projects (Jones 1986),
as well as national markets. Nevertheless, the reports or articles cited provided
several suggestions of differences between Japanese and U.S. practice and










Japanese software developers copy or rely on Western tools
and techniques (Table 1).
Japanese software is less sophisticated than U.S. software
(Table 1).
Japanese software development managers are ahead in project
management (Table 2).
Japanese software developers make greater use of reused code
(Table 2).
Japanese software developers are ahead in tool usage (Table
2).
Japanese software developers are ahead in software
productivity (Table 2).
Japanese software developers are ahead in software quality
'(Table 2).
Analysis of commonly-defined data collected as part of this research
should either support or question these propositions, as well as indicate if there
are significant interrelationships among some of the variables.
111. Research Methodology
The methodology adopted to compare Japanese and U.S. firms was to
collect data on standardized forms from individual development sites for
particular software systems. The first task was to compile a list of major
software producers and development sites in each country that also were
comparable in terms of product or project size and applications. Names of
firms came from annual lists of the largest software producers in U.S. and
Japanese publications (Datamation 1985, Kiriu 1986). Annual reports and other
company information indicated the location of major software sites. The next
step was to identify managers of software development at these sites willing to
complete a standardized data-collection form on one or more systems of their
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choice. The approach taken was to contact the managers of production
engineering or quality assurance in each development site by letter and by
telephone, explain the purpose of the study, and ask for their cooperation in
return for a copy of the research report.
Managers at 44 development sites in the United States (and one from a
Japanese joint venture returned from its U.S. partner) initially agreed to
complete the form and submit data on projects of their choice; 28 were
returned, from 12 firms. Managers at 26 development sites in Japan also agreed
to complete the form on projects of their choice; 20 were returned, from 9
firms (See Appendices A and B). After review of the returned forms,
augmentation of incomplete forms or clarification of responses was attempted by
telephone or letter. The end result of this additional effort was that 4 of the
U.S. surveys and 4 of the Japanese were not usable. Either they did not
include enough data or the respondent who filled out the survey indicated too
many doubts about the reliability of the data. In addition, the one returned by
a U.S. company from its joint venture in Japan was excluded from the study,
since this appeared to represent a combination of Japanese and U.S. practices
or personnel. Thus the response rate for returns was 48 out of 70 (69%), and 40
out of the 48 projects (83%) were used in this research, although not every
data-collection form contained complete information on each question. 3
The high percentage of returns (given the detailed data required) seemed
due to the personal commitments the researchers sought from individuals in
each firm and continued appeals by telephone and letters until most of the
surveys sent out came back completed. Companies were also promised
confidentiality, i.e. no project data would be directly associated with a
particular company. One obstacle to getting a larger sample was that, for the
3 For example, 9 of the 40 did not report quality (defect) data.
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U.S. firms in particular, many did not collect data (such as on work years by
phase of development, lines of code produced, defect levels by degree of
severity and over time), in sufficient detail to participate. This contrasted to
the Japanese firms, where data collection appeared to be more routine and
thorough. Also, some firms in both countries, even after initially agreeing to
submit data, decided not to divulge this information on productivity and quality
for competitive reasons, even when promised confidentiality.
It should be noted that the sample was not random. The research
identified leading producers who collected detailed information on their
development processes. The research also followed the methodology used by
Zelkowitz et al. (1984), allowing managers to select on what systems to report
data. One must therefore assume that companies probably chose their best
projects, or at least projects under sufficient control for them to have fairly
detailed data on productivity, quality, and other measures. In short, the sample
remains exploratory. Nevertheless, it is believed to give an indication of "good
practice" in the U.S. and Japan, at a selected group of firms that collected
detailed data and took an interest in software-development management. It also
provides a unique opportunity to assess quantitatively the claims and counter
claims raised by anecdotal reports over the last decade.
IV. Descriptive Data
In this section the Japanese and U.S. samples are compared in terms of a
number of descriptive dimensions: application type, programming language,
hardware platform, and size.
The data-collection forms, in addition to requesting information on
productivity and quality, requested a brief description of the purpose of the
software. This allowed the researchers to characterize the 40 software systems
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into one of the standard applications described by Jones (1986): (1) data
processing (e.g., financial database, human resource), (2) scientific (e.g.,
simulation models, CAD tool), (3) systems software (e.g., operating system,
compiler), and (4) telecommunications and other real-time systems (e.g.,
switching, data transmission, and network processing). The distribution of
projects in the total sample, shown in Table 3, appears comparable, although
not identical. To determine if product type affected performance measures, the
analyses that will follow include variables that represent possible differences in
application mix across the two samples.
Proposition 1: Japanese software developers copy or rely on Western tools
and techniques (Table 1).
Lists of applications, programming languages, and hardware platforms, as
well as the tools used in software development, indicate that Japanese firms
have largely followed the lead of the U.S. and Europe, where this technology
was invented. For example, primary application languages are quite consistent
across the two countries (see Table 4a). The U.S. firms have somewhat more
representation in Assembly and COBOL, although this reflected the greater
percentage of real time and data processing systems, respectively (see Table 4b).
The hardware platform on which they were delivered are virtually identical,
even though the Japanese firms have a slightly greater percentage of
microcomputer implementations, and the U.S. firms a small advantage in
mainframes (Table 5). More detailed comparisons of tools used discussed below
(sees Tables 11 and 12) also lend support to Proposition 1 and to the more
specific statement that, in terms of applications, languages, and hardware
platforms, as well as tools, there do not appear to be significant differences
between the U.S. and Japanese samples under analysis in this paper.
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Proposition 2: Japanese software is less sophisticated than U.S. software
(Table 1).
The term "sophistication" is vague in the context of software. One aspect
might be the type and number of functions available in a program, although
neither this study nor any other known to these authors has directly compared
Japanese and U.S. software in terms of functionality. The writers who claimed
Japanese software lacked sophistication specifically stated or implied that
Japanese programs appeared less "complex" than U.S. software (Uttal 1984, OTA
1987). If one accepts that there is a strong association between the complexity
of software and the size of a system, then the data collected make it possible
to compare the Japanese and U.S. systems in an area related to sophistication.
The conventional measure for size in a software project is the number of
non-comment source lines of code, or SLOC that are produced (Boehm 1981,
Conte et al. 1986, Jones 1986, Putnam 1978, Walston and Felix 1977). This
metric has a long history in both research and practice, and has been the
subject of much debate concerning rules for counting SLOC and their efficacy
as an input metric for project estimation as well as a measure of productivity
(Albrecht and Gaffney, 1983, Jones 1986, Kemerer 1987). The current state of
the debate is best summarized by this statement from a recent article by Barry
Boehm: "The current bottom line for most organizations is that delivered source
instructions (lines) per project man-month... is a more practical productivity
metric than the currently available alternatives" (Boehm 1987). In order to
compare system size as well as productivity across a number of organizations,
this research chose non-comment SLOC as the output size metric and
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work-years as the input size metric. 4 Table 6 shows the means and medians of
these metrics. Note that the U.S. and Japanese systems are of roughly
comparable size, and the results of the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test
(equivalent to a Mann-Whitney U test) were that no statistically significant
difference was found (Bradley 1968: 105-114).
One possible concern with the use of SLOC metrics for inter-project
comparisons is the variance in programming languages. "A line" of Fortran may
not be equivalent to "a line" in Assembly language, for example. To control for
this source of variance, the SLOC measures were converted to a common size of
Fortran equivalent statements, using the conversion factors proposed by Jones
(1986: 49, Jones 1988). For example, using languages in the current sample,
Assembly language is at "level" 1, and Fortran is at "level" 3. It thus takes 3
lines of assembly language to equal 1 line of Fortran. This conversion was
performed on all of the SLOC data, and the results are also shown in Table 6.
Note that the conversion produces Fortran-equivalent LOC that are slightly
smaller than the raw SLOC data, due to the languages used. Note also that the
relative numbers between the U.S. and Japanese companies do not change
significantly, which would be expected given the similar language set in each
country's data. It follows that no support is found for Proposition 2, that
40ne possible concern about such a measure is the reputation of Japanese
firms for long work days. (e.g., In the automobile industry Japanese employees
tended to work about 15% more days per year than their U.S. counterparts(Cusumano 1985).) However, it appears that hourly differences were relatively
minor for U.S. and Japanese system developers. In Japan, 1987 figures indicate
the average weekly hours for the information-processing services industry were
37.6 and, for the software industry (system engineering, programming,
operations), 37.3 hours. The Japanese reported modest overtime hours per week,
averaging 6.2 in information-processing services and 7.7 in the software industry(Joho Sabisu Sangyo Kyokai 1987: 118-119, 133). In the U.S., for SIC code #737(computer programming, data processing, and other computer-related services),
average regular hours worked per week (excluding overtime) in 1987 were 37.5,
nearly identical to Japan. U.S. employees also worked overtime as needed,
although the U.S. Department of Labor did not collect these data for service
industries (U.S. Department of Labor 1989).
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Japanese software is less sophisticated than U.S., at least to the degree that
system size reflects sophistication.
V. Process Data
In addition to the descriptive data described in Section IV, data were
collected on the process of software development as practiced in the U.S. and
Japan. These data consist of both the labor (project staffing) and capital (tool
usage) inputs to the software development process.
A. Labor Inputs
One widely used surrogate for the quality of personnel employed on a
project is their average years of experience (Chrysler 1978, Banker et al. 1987).
As can be seen in Table 7, these levels are essentially identical for the data
from the two countries. This contrasts with claims (such as Lecht 1989) of
greater shortages of experienced software developers in Japan compared to the
U.S. Therefore, any existing management or performance differences between
the countries in this sample are unlikely to be explained by differences in
experience as measured by years of employment in software development.
Proposition 3: Japanese software development managers are ahead in project
management (Table 2).
The literature suggested the Japanese were strong in various areas of
project management, such as planning, discipline, and teamwork. The data
collected focused more on performance measures, such as productivity and
quality (defects), which probably reflect management skills, but did not directly
define areas of management and attempt measurements. However, the form did
request data on how projects used personnel, such as the allocation of effort
15
across the systems development life-cycle, and this provides some insight into
project management. In particular, previous researchers have suggested that
performance differences may be due to increased emphasis on the initial stages
of the development life cycle (Gaffney 1982, McKeen 1983).
Average data relating to life-cycle emphasis as collected on the individual
systems are shown in Table 8. For purposes of this data collection effort,
"Design" includes the pre-coding specification as well as the design phase.
"Coding" includes programming, and "Testing" includes debugging. As can be
seen, on average the Japanese spend significantly more (at the alpha = .01
level) time in the early life cycle phase, and significantly less (at the alpha =
.05 level) in the coding phases. These data provide support for Proposition 3 to
the degree that emphasizing design and de-emphasizing coding is seen as
desirable. The difference in testing percentage was also higher, although this
difference was not statistically significant at usual levels. The data from Table
8 suggest hypotheses relating to performance measures that will be tested in
Section VI below -- namely, that the Japanese firms in this sample spend a
greater percentage of time in the design and test phases (although the latter
difference was not statistically significant).
Data were also collected on the composition of the work-years in terms of
full-time versus part-time project participation in each of the phases. As
shown in Table 9, these data are similar for the two countries in the design
and coding phases, but the Japanese projects show significantly greater reliance
on full-time testing personnel than do the U.S. firms. This is another
difference in project management that supports suggestions by other researchers
that Japanese firms excel in defect analysis (Zelkowitz 1984) and other aspects




A number of researchers have used an economic production process model
for software development to suggest that one way to improve productivity is to
emulate industries that substituted reliable, low marginal-cost capital inputs for
repetitive activities (Kriebel and Raviv 1980, Stabell 1982, Kemerer 1988,
Cusumano 1989). In the domain of software, capital inputs most readily take
the form of tools and techniques for augmenting human labor. For this study
data were collected on two forms of capital input, code reuse and software
tools.
Proposition 4: Japanese software developers make greater use of reused code
(Table 2).
The issue of code reuse has received a tremendous amount of attention
recently as a potential "silver bullet" for the software crisis (Brooks 1987). 5
Unfortunately, with only a few exceptions (e.g. Selby 1988), little empirical data
has been published on actual reuse in industrial settings. The data for the U.S.
and Japanese firms presented in this paper are shown in Table 10. (Since
industry experts have theorized that high degrees of software reuse should
greatly improve nominal productivity levels (Jones 1986), but without empirical
data to demonstrate this, Appendix C presents the results of a test of this
relationship using data from the U.S. and Japanese systems.)
Consistent with previous reports (see Table 2), the Japanese firms seem to
exhibit higher levels of reuse than U.S. firms. Higher reusability in Japan
would also be consistent with assertions that the Japanese have taken the lead
in promoting software reuse, even without solving all the accompanying
5See also the collection of papers in Freeman 1987, and the special issue
of IEEE Transactions on Software Engineerina, September 1984.
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difficulties (Tracz 1988). However, the difference in this sample is not
statistically significant at usual levels. Therefore, while the data appear to
support Proposition 4, they cannot be used to reject the motion that there may
be no difference in reuse levels in this sample. The data also suggest that the
very high percentages of reuse for the Japanese cited by some researchers (such
as 85% in Standish 1984) represent isolated best practice or unusual projects.
Proposition 5: Japanese software developers are ahead in tool usage (Table
2).
Another area of software development technology that has received
considerable research attention is the provision of tools, particularly so-called
CASE (Computer-Aided Software Engineering) tools, to support software
development (Henderson and Cooprider 1988). In order to investigate their
degree of use in the U.S. and Japan, data were collected with an open format
design, as follows:
Software Enaineerina Tools
List in importance the name and main function of
the most frequently used support and development





An alternative would have been to use a closed format, asking respondents
to check the applicable boxes. It is believed that this area of practice is too
ill-established for such an approach. The open format at least permitted an
exploratory evaluation of the scope and breadth of tool usage. Table 11 shows
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the average number of tools listed by firms in each of the two countries.6
This gross level of analysis suggests that Japanese and U.S. firms had similar
levels of tool usage.
Due to the detailed level of the data, a finer level of analysis can be
performed, as shown in Table 12, which presents the tool usage statistics
broken down by type of tool used. By decomposing the usage into these
categories, the numbers of firms using any given type of tool become very
small, and therefore standard statistical tests seem inappropriate. Examination
of the table indicates that Japanese and U.S. projects used a comparable range
of tools, but with a few differences. In terms of analysis and design, similar
numbers of firms report using tools to support these activities, although the
Japanese report greater use of automatic flowcharting tools. In coding,
Japanese firms reported much greater use of what are referred to in Table 12
as "Utilities", e.g. such tools as domain-specific editors and specialized
compilers. Also, none of the U.S. firms reported using either code generators
or reusable code libraries (tools developed in the U.S. and promoted by U.S.
experts in software engineering -- see, for example, Boehm 1981, Brooks 1987).
Note that zero use of code libraries is not necessarily inconsistent with
the code reuse numbers cited earlier. Several studies describe how code reuse
can be done formally, through corporate or department code libraries, or
informally, through ad hoc reuse and private libraries (Woodfield et al. 1987).
This is an important distinction for managers, since there is some debate in the
reuse literature regarding the cost and benefits of reuse, and the variance in
6 The form permitted a maximum of 10 responses, and two of the 40
responses (one from each country) actually included 10 tools. Therefore, for
these two data points a possible methods bias exists in terms of a ceiling
effect. However, given that this was the case for only 2 of the 40 responses
and that there is one from each country, this is not believed to be a major
source of error.
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how reuse is supported institutionally has been suggested as a factor that has
an impact on these costs and benefits (Cusumano 1989, Matsumoto 1987).
While data on testing or debugging tools is similar across the U.S. and
Japanese firms, the percentage of respondents claiming use of these tools was
relatively high (roughly two-thirds), compared to data cited by Zelkowitz et al.,
which shows only 27% claiming use (Zelkowitz, et al., 1984). The difference in
these two observations may stem from the five years difference in when the
two sets of data were collected, which would suggest that usage of such tools
has become much more common. Other tools showed similar levels of use
across the two countries. Thus, in general, the data do not lend strong support
to Proposition 5. The Japanese projects did claim far more extensive use of
coding utilities and used automated flowcharting and reuse-support tools that
the U.S. projects did not, although the U.S. projects listed some tools
(performance testing, schedule tracking) that the Japanese did not.
VI. Performance Metrics and Models
The literature suggests that the relative performance of U.S. and Japanese
software developers has become of great interest to managers concerned with
identifying and understanding good practice in the software industry as well as
to U.S. government analysts and others concerned with the international
"competitiveness" of U.S. firms. As noted in the introduction to this paper, the
literature is divided between those who feel the Japanese are behind and
unlikely to be a threat in software (Table 1) and those who feel the Japanese
are already superior in some respects to the U.S. (Table 2). Thus far, authors
have supported claims with descriptions or numbers from one or two Japanese
sites, which may or may not be exceptional. This section presents the results
of the quantitative analysis of productivity and quality on the current sample.
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Proposition 6: Japanese software developers are ahead in software
productivity (Table 2).
Productivity is defined here as non-comment Fortran equivalent source
lines of code per work year (Jones 1986, 1988). Table 13 presents the
comparison of the U.S. and Japanese firms along this dimension. 7 Both the
mean and median for the Japanese firms are higher (58% to 71%) than the U.S.
numbers, although the differences are not statistically significant at usual levels
(alpha = .18). Therefore, the data, while seeming to support Proposition 6,
cannot be used with a high degree of confidence to reject the notion that there
may be no difference. Compared to the single-site data reported by other
researchers, the Japanese do not appear as productive as the most dramatic
claims (e.g., the U.S. Department of Commerce study asserting the equivalent of
24,000 SLOC/year for the Japanese), but they appear better than some modest
estimates (e.g., the 1984 claim by Sakai of only a 10% to 15% advantage for
Japan). While other studies' numbers did not take programming-language
differences into account, after making these adjustments, the data presented in
Table 13 strongly support the notion that, at the least, Japanese systems
developers are by no means behind their U.S. counterparts in terms of lines-of-
code productivity.
While differences across countries may have implications for long-term
competitiveness, of immediate interest to software managers is why differences
exist among projects and between the samples from Japan and the U.S. In
particular, can Japanese results be explained by differences in the composition
71n order to check the sensitivity of the results to the Fortran conversion,
the same test was run on the unadjusted data, which yielded similar results.
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of the systems delivered in the two countries? In order to answer this and
other questions, a simple linear model of labor productivity was developed, using
variables reflecting differences in the two country sample that could reasonably
be assumed to have an impact on productivity. The variables chosen are shown
in Table 14.
The hypothesized impact of these variables is as follows. Data processing
applications are perceived to be less difficult, and are more likely to use higher
level languages than other applications (such as scientific or real-time), and
therefore should exhibit higher productivity (Boehm 1981, Jones 1986).
Mainframe applications may be less productive than minicomputer or
microcomputer applications, as they imply larger, more complex projects than
minicomputer applications, and therefore diseconomies of scale may set in
(Brooks 1975, Boehm 1981, Banker and Kemerer 1989). In addition, they may add
response time delays due to being a large, shared resource where development
may compete with production jobs for machine cycles (Banker et al. 1989).
Greater time in the coding phase may be a sign of projects with
inadequately specified designs, or so-called "gold-plating" (Boehm 1981), which
also would suggest projects with less resulting productivity. Finally, greater
code reuse will increase productivity as measured by SLOC (Jones 1984). The
results of the model are shown in Table 15.
This model explains about half of the variation in productivity in these
data. The signs of the coefficients of the independent variables are all in the
expected direction. The value for code reuse is significant at the alpha<.001
level, the values for data processing application and mainframe platform are
significant at the alpha=.05 level, and the value for coding phase percentage is
significant at the alpha=.10 level.
In terms of explaining U.S./Japanese differences, the greater code reuse
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and less time spent during coding clearly seems to aid the Japanese firms. The
U.S. had more data-processing systems, which exhibit higher productivity than
the more technical systems. Therefore, this sample may tend to understate the
U. S./Japan productivity differences (due to the U. S. sample having proportionally
more data-processing projects) compared with an identically matched sample. 8
Proposition 7: Japanese software developers are ahead in software quality
(Table 2).
Quality is a particularly important performance measure since it has long
been argued that overall productivity, that is, productivity taking into account
the life-cycle maintenance required to fix software defects, is directly related
to the quality of the original designs and code (Brooks 1975, Boehm 1981). The
quality metric chosen for this research was the number of failures per thousand
non-comment source lines of code during the first 12 months of the system's
service. Failures were defined as "basic service interruptions or basic service
degradations of severity such that correction was not deferrable." Data were
available from 20 of the U.S. firms and 11 of the Japanese firms, and are
presented in Table 16.
Similar to the results for productivity, the Japanese firms showed mean
and median numbers of failures lower than the U.S. firms (one-half to one-
fourth), although these differences were not statistically significant at generally
accepted confidence levels (alpha = .16). Again, these data do not represent
8The Belsley-Kuh-Welch test of collinearity was run, and no confounding
of these results by collinearity is suggested (Belsley 1980). The residuals were
plotted against the predicted y values, and the pattern suggested possible
heteroscedasticity. However, the results of a Goldfeld-Quandt test on each of
the independent variables was that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity could
not be rejected at the alpha=.01 level (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981: 104-105).
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the extremes suggested by some previous research (e.g., the U.S. Department of
Commerce study claimed that Japanese error rates were one-tenth the U.S.
rates). However, the Japanese median does support a prior claim of .3
defects/1000 SLOC (Haavind 1986). Therefore, the data suggest support for
Proposition 7, but cannot be used with a high degree of confidence to reject
the notion that there may be no difference.
As for productivity, while verifying the differences across countries
provides indications of where "best practice" might be occurring, software
managers should be most interested in why quality differences exist. Can these
results be explained by differences in the composition of the systems delivered
in the two countries? In order to answer this question, a simple linear model
of quality was developed, using variables reflecting differences in the two
country sample that could reasonably be assumed to have an impact on quality.
The variables chosen are shown in Table 17.
The hypothesized impact of these variables is as follows. The larger a
system, the more difficulty in thoroughly testing it. A greater percentage of
time in the testing phase should reduce the number of later failures. The only
possible effect of mainframes may be the possibly greater availability of
testing/debugging tools. However, this can be measured directly, so the
hardware platform categorical variable is not included, and in its place is the
number of testing/debugging tools used, which would be expected to improve
quality.9
9 Variables relating to system type (data processing or real-time), were not
included in the model, since the relation of system type to quality is not widely
agreed upon. Data processing applications may, in general, have less stringent
reliability requirements, and therefore may exhibit lower quality. On the other
hand, the perceived greater complexity of real-time systems may make them
harder to debug, and therefore their quality may be less. Depending upon
which effect dominates, the reliability requirement or the complexity factor, it
is unclear what the sign of these variables will be. However, a model including
these variables was run for purposes of sensitivity analysis, and these system-
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The results of the model are shown in Table 18. The interpretation of the
model is that more failures/1000 SLOC are present in larger systems (significant
at the alpha=.001 level). A greater percentage of time spent in the testing
phase reduces the error rate, as does a greater use of testing tools (both
results are significant at approximately the alpha=.10 level). 10 In terms of
explaining U.S./Japanese differences, given that the failure rate is higher in
larger systems, and given the somewhat larger size of the Japanese systems in
this sample, the difference between the two countries may tend to be
underestimated compared to a sample of identically matched systems.
VII. Conclusions
This paper began by summarizing an ongoing debate revolving around how
well the Japanese are performing in software development, an area where U.S.
firms have dominated since the beginning of the industry. Anecdotal literature,
based on one or two companies or on information from only one site and not
analyzed statistically, provided confusing evidence. Assertions ranged from
claims that Japanese firms were already vastly superior to U.S. firms in
software productivity and quality to suggestions the Japanese were still far
behind the U.S. in this industry by a variety of measures. The research
presented here provides what appears to be the first review of existing
literature as well as the first quantitative data analysis comparing software-
development practice and performance in the U.S. and Japan.
Data from 40 systems do not support propositions that there are major
differences between U.S. and Japanese performance in software development,
either in a positive or negative sense. Japanese and U.S. firms appeared to use
type variables were not found to be significant.
10 The discussion in footnote 8 applies here as well.
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similar tools, develop systems of comparable sophistication, and displayed
statistically comparable levels of reuse, productivity, and quality. However, to
those who argued that Japan lagged far behind the U.S., it seems clear that
Japanese software developers are, at a minimum, as good, in productivity,
quality, and management, as their U.S. counterparts. In fact, it would be a
mistake for U.S. firms to be complacent in this industry. Japanese performance,
as reflected in the collected metrics, on average appears to be superior to the
U.S., although differences were not significant statistically, reflecting high
variances as well as the small size of the final sample. These are,
unfortunately, common problems in the collection of empirical data on software
engineering (Jones 1986). Nonetheless, the study revealed potentially emerging
and important differences.
In project management, individual years of experience were similar, in
contrast to claims that the Japanese lacked experienced staff, compared to the
U.S. Yet there were significant differences in how these personnel were used.
The Japanese spent less time than their U.S. counterparts on coding, a
relatively routine part of software development, and more time on design.
Productivity, measured as non-comment lines of code per work year and
adjusted for different languages, was about 60% to 70% higher in the Japanese
projects, in spite of some application differences in the sample that may have
favored the U.S. Analysis of the data further suggested that code reuse and
less time spent in coding boosted Japanese productivity averages. The number
of major defects per 1000 lines of code in the first twelve months after
delivery in Japanese software products was half or less than in the U.S. sample.
This again suggests a difference of potential importance for managers interested
both in good practice and potential competition from Japan. The analysis also
revealed that (1) larger projects tended to have more defects, and (2) the
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Japanese tended to have fewer defects in spite of having slightly larger systems
on average in this sample. More time spent in testing, and greater use of
testing tools, was shown to be associated with lower error rates.
Larger-sample studies, longitudinal analyses to -identify rates of
improvement, as well as more exploration of differences in management and
development practices, are needed to explore further the comparison of Japanese
and U.S. software producers. International comparisons are important both to
probe the reasons behind good practice, wherever this may occur, and to
evaluate the performance of individual firms and projects.
As for future competition from the Japanese in software, detailed studies
of companies and facilities reveal that the Japanese are paying increasing
attention to product functionality and ease of use (Cusumano 1989), as well as
reusability and automation. Combined with greater attention already being paid
to design and testing, and their apparent strengths in managing the process of
software development, it is likely the Japanese will continue to improve their
capabilities and potential for international competition in software. It is an
open question to what extent companies from Japan will emerge as strong rivals
of U.S. or European firms outside Japan, where local service and relationships,
as well as fluency in local languages and business practices, may be as
important as expertise in systems development. Japanese firms also need to
have a surplus of skilled software personnel versed in foreign languages and
practices to develop custom applications or packages for export, and they did
not appear to have this surplus in the 1980s.
In conclusion, this study suggests that Japanese and U.S. performance in
software development at the moment is more alike than different, and projects
from both countries display considerable variability. However, the high levels
of productivity, quality, and reuse emanating from Japan may be a cause for
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concern among some U.S. managers. At the least, Japanese software producers
analyzed in this research have already set very high standards for performance,
matching if not exceeding the best U.S. firms. If the Japanese continue or
even improve upon these high levels, and master other elements needed to
compete overseas in software development, companies from Japan may someday
prove to be strong competitors in yet another industry.
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Table 1: Negative Comments About Japanese Software Development
Comments: Sou rces: Quantitative Data:
PROCESS
Copy/Rely on Western Tools Kim 1983 None
and Techniques Zelkowitz 1984 None
Kishida 1987 None
Cusumano 1989 Managers' Survey
Severe Shortage of Skilled Lecht 1989 None
Programmers
More Costly Software Uttal 1984 None
PRODUCTS
Lack Creativity Uttal 1984 None
Rifkin and Savage 1989 None
No Inventions U.S. Commerce 1984 Historical Lists
Less Sophisticated Uttal 1984 None
Few Packages Kim 1983 None
U.S. Commerce 1984 None
OTA 1987 Industry Data
Behind in Basic Research U.S. Commerce 1984 None
Gamaota & Frieman 1988 Anecdotal
GENERAL ASSESSMENT
Behind the U.S. Overall U.S. Commerce 1984 None
Sakai 1984 None
OTA 1987 Industry Data




Table 6: Input and Output Metrics
Wilcoxon Rank Sums
Z APproximation
Work-years 102 (22.5) 47 (20.1)









Table 7: Personnel Experience

























Table 8: Effort by Phase
Effort Distribution by Phase









** = .05, *** = .01
Table 9: Full-Time Effort















Code Reuse (% of Delivered Lines)
U.S. (median) Japan Wilcoxon Rank Sums
Z Approximation
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Table 2: Positive Comments About Japanese Software Development
Comments: Sources: Quantitative Data:
PROCESS
Ahead in Quality (defects) Zelkowitz 1984 None
and "Product Engineering" Johnson 1985 None
U.S. Commerce 1984 None
Haavind 1986 1 Company's Data
OTA 1987 1 Company's Data
Gamaota & Frieman 1988 1 Company's Data
Ahead in Tool Usage Kim 1983 None
Zelkowitz 1984 Site Survey
U.S. Commerce 1984 None
Johnson 1985 None
Gamaota & Frieman 1988 None
Ahead in Productivity Kim 1983 1 Company's Data
U.S. Commerce 1984 Anecdotal
Haavind 1986 1 Company's Data
Gamaota & Frieman 1988 1 Company's Data
Ahead in Reuse Standish 1984 Anecdotal
Haavind 1986 Anecdotal
Gamaota & Frieman 1988 1 Company's Data
Tracz 1988 Anecdotal
Cusumano 1989 Manager Survey
Ahead in Maintenance Kishida 1986 None
Nikkei/Cusumano 1988 User Surveys
Ahead in Project Naur and Randall 1969 None
Management (Planning, Tajima & Matsubara 1981 1 Company's Data
Discipline, Teamwork) Zelkowitz 1984 None




Good in Custom Nikkei/Cusumano 1988 User Surveys
Programming OTA 1987 None
Good in Specific Applications Kim 1983 None
(Real-Time, Al, Graphics, Uttal 1984 None
Supercomputer, MIS, On-Line Sakai 1984 None
Reservations, Embedded, Gamaota & Frieman 1988 None
Jap. language processing) Lecht 1989 None
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1 1 Note that only 36 of the 40 systems are shown as systems with multiple
platforms are excluded.
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Table 11: Tool Usage
Mean Tools/Methods Reported Used Per Proiect
U.S. (median) Japan Wilcoxon Rank Sums
Z Approximation
Number Used 4.04 (4) 4.13 (4) -. 06
Table 12: Detailed Tool Usaae
Types of Tools Used - Percentage (%) Reporting Use
U.S, Japan
Analysis/Design
Design support 29.2 31.3
Auto. Flowchart 4.2 18.8
Codinm
Utilities 29.2 75.0
Envir. Mgmt. 37.5 25.0
Data Mgmt. 12.5 6.3
Code Generators 0.0 6.3




Performance Testing 4.2 0.0
Other Tools
Docum. Support 8.3 6.3
Schedule Tracking 16.7 0.0
Problem Tracking 29.2 6.3




Table 13: Mean Productivity (Fortran-Equivalent SLOC/Work-Year)
U.S. (median) Japan Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Z App rox imation
Fortran productivity 7290 (2943) 12447 (4663)







Dummy variable, =1 if application is data processing, else 0.
Dummy variable, =1 if hardware platform is mainframe, else 0.
Percentage of time in coding phase
Percentage of code reused
Table 15: Productivity Regression Results
(values of t-statistics shown in parentheses)








Table 16: Software Quality
(failures/KSLOC during first 12 months)
U.S. (median) Jaian Wilcoxon Rank Sum(n=20) (n=11) Z Approximation
Failures/KSLOC 4.44 (.83) 1.96(.20) -1.40
Table 17: Independent Variables in Quality Regression
Variable Explanation
x1 Size of system in 1000s of Fortran-equivalent SLOC
X2 Percentage of time in testing phase
X3 Number of testing/debugging tools used
Table 18: Quality Regression Results
(Values of t-statistics shown in parentheses)
Failures/KSLOC = 9.65 + .01 x - 15.44 x - 4.68 x 3(2.84) (3.9d) (-.1.67, (-1.84)
R 2 A






























Appendix B: ComPanies and Product Areas Participating in the Study
U.S. Sites/Product Areas
Amdahl/Product Software
Amdahl/Engineering Software (2 Projects)
AT T Bell Laboratories/Switching Communications (2 Projects)




Financial Planning Technologies/Planning Systems
Harris Corporation/Government Support Systems (2 Projects)
Hewlett-Packard/Medical Division (2 Projects)
Yokogawa/Hewlett- Packa rd/Medical Products
Honeywell/Corporate Systems (3 Projects)
Hughes Aircraft/Communications & Data Processing (3 Projects)
International Business Machines/Basic Systems Software
International Business Machines/Systems Integration Division
Unisys/Computer Systems (3 Projects)
Bell Communications Research/Applications
Bell Communications Research/Software Technology & Systems
Japanese Sites/Product Areas
Fujitsu/Communications Software





Hitachi Software Engineering/Financial Systems




Mitsubishi Electric/Power Industrial Systems Software
Nippon Business Consultant/System Software
Nippon Electronics Development/Communications Systems
Nippon Electronics Development/Information Service Systems
Nippon Systemware/System Software
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone/System Software




Appendix C: A Model of Software Reuse and Productivity
While it is generally agreed that reusability is a desirable concept, little
work has been done on attempting to quantify the impact of reuse (Seppanen
1987). In fact, Standish has noted that "... it seems a great deal of insight
could be gained from collecting and analyzing data derived from examples where
software reuse techniques have been successfully applied in practice" (Standish
1984). One of the few economic models of reuse is provided by Gaffney and
Durek (1988). They propose that the relative cost of a system that reuses code
versus a completely new system is represented by the equation:
C = (1-R) + (R*b)
where C = the relative cost (=1 for an all new system)
R = the percentage of reused code
b = the relative cost of reuse versus writing new code
(assumed to be <= 1 by Gaffney and Durek)
They further suggest that the value of b is related to the degree of reuse,
i.e., whether just code is reused or whether there is related design reuse. They
provide a hypothetical example, wherein the value of b is equal to 1-p, where p
is the percentage of time spent in the phase or phases represented by the
reused component. For example, if coding is 15% of the life-cycle, then a
system that only reuses code, but not requirements or design, would cost about
85% of the hypothetical cost of an all new system (Gaffney and Durek 1988:
48).
It is possible to test the Gaffney-Durek model using the U.S.-Japanese
data-set. Given the value of R, the value of b can be estimated via linear
regression, as follows:
y = B + B 1X 1 + B 2x 2
where y = work years
X1 = New KSLOC (= KSLOC*(1-R))
X2 = Reused KSLOC (=KSLOC*R)
The estimate of this model for the data-set is as follows:
y = -15.024 + .306 x 1 + .195 x 2(-.44) (4.15) (.55)
The signs of the coefficients of both the new and reused code are
positive, as would be expected, because even reused code is not "free" (without
effort). And, the coefficient on the reused code is less, only about two-thirds
of that for the new code, which is also what would be expected, since if it
took greater effort, presumably programmers would simply write new code
(Woodfield et al. 1987). The estimated value of b then, is:
b = B2 / B = .64
Given an average percentage of time spent in the coding phase of 32%
(.36*(24/40) + .25*(16/40)*100), the model would predict that b = (1-.32) = .68,
quite close to that obtained from the estimate.
In terms of the sensitivity of this result, one concern is the low
t-statistic on the estimate of B2. This suggests that a high degree of
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confidence cannot be placed in rejecting the null hypothesis that the "true"
value of B2 = 0. The noise in the estimate may be caused by differing levels
of support for reuse, both in Japan and in the U.S. In other words, facilities
with excellent support for reuse may show a lower number and those with poor
support may show a higher number, leading to an average value of .195 with a
large variance. However, lacking any other data, the value of .195 is the single
best point estimate available. In addition, the fact that the value approximates
that predicted from the theory also tends to increase confidence in the
estimate. Of course, this result needs additional validation before any general
claims can be made, but this initial result is encouraging.
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